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INTRODUCTION

Meet the Wilcoxes, Marvin and Pamela. Marvin and Pamela
were investors in a Ponzi scheme' operated by Marsha Schubert,
who defrauded investors out of more than $9 million. Instead of
investing participants' money legitimately, Schubert would use
the money to pay out "profits" to other participants. These "profits" were solely the product of the Ponzi scheme-there were no
legitimate profitable investments. The Wilcoxes benefited from
the scheme, in the form of purported profits, to the tune of
$500,000.2 The Oklahoma Department of Securities brought a
state court action against the Wilcoxes and others who had benefited from the Ponzi scheme, alleging that they were liable for
unjust enrichment and arguing that they should be required to
disgorge any profits they received from the scheme. The state
court ruled in favor of the Department of Securities and ordered
the Wilcoxes to repay those funds.3 After the state court ruled in
favor of the Department of Securities, the Wilcoxes filed a

t AB 2011, Harvard College; JD Candidate 2014, The University of Chicago Law
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1 A "Ponzi" scheme is a term generally used to describe an investment scheme
which is not really supported by any underlying business venture. The investors are paid profits from the principal sums paid in by newly attracted investors. Usually those who invest in the scheme are promised large returns on
their principal investments. The initial investors are indeed paid the sizable
promised returns. This attracts additional investors. More and more investors
need to be attracted into the scheme so that the growing number of investors
on top can get paid. The person who runs this scheme typically uses some of
the money invested for personal use. Usually this pyramid collapses and most
investors not only do not get paid their profits, but also lose their principal investments.
In re Randy, 189 Bankr 425, 437 n 17 (Bankr ND Ill 1995).
2
Oklahoma Department of Securities v Wilcox, 691 F3d 1171, 1173 (10th Cir
2012).
3
Id.
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Chapter 7 bankruptcy action seeking discharge of their debtsincluding the state court judgment requiring them to disgorge
their profits from the Ponzi scheme.4
Violations of securities laws, of which Schubert's Ponzi
scheme is just one example, often create losers: those who are
harmed by a particular violation. But they can also create winners like the Wilcoxes: third parties who, through knowledge of
the violation or through dumb luck-but not through any personal wrongdoing-benefit from the violation. These winners are
usually not allowed to keep those ill-gotten gains and are required to disgorge their profits.6 In the meantime, though, their
good fortune may turn bad-they could become insolvent and
might file for bankruptcy.
In general, an individual debtor can discharge his debts in
bankruptcy.6 But Congress has created several debt-specific exceptions to discharge.7 For instance, a debtor cannot discharge
debts incurred through fraud or as a result of an intentional
tort.8 With the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act,9 Congress
added another debt-specific discharge exception to the Bankruptcy Code: debts for the violation of federal or state securities
laws cannot be discharged in bankruptcy.o But the provision is
ambiguous: Is the exception limited to debts incurred by securities

4
Id. The Oklahoma state district court ordered the Wilcoxes to return all their
profits from the Ponzi scheme. The Wilcoxes appealed to the Oklahoma Supreme Court,
which ruled that repayment of profits by innocent investors was appropriate only if those
investors had received an unreasonable rate of return. The court remanded to the district court so that it could apply the new standard. See Oklahoma Department of Securities v Blair, 231 P3d 645, 669 (Okla 2010). On remand, the district court declined to apply the new standard on the grounds that the Wilcoxes were not innocent investors. The
Wilcoxes appealed once again, but the Oklahoma Supreme Court affirmed. See Oklahoma Department of Securities v Wilcox, 267 P3d 106, 111 (Okla 2011). The Wilcoxes later
filed for bankruptcy, and the Oklahoma Department of Securities initiated adverse proceedings to avoid discharge of their disgorgement debt. The bankruptcy court ruled that
the debt was nondischargeable and the district court affirmed the bankruptcy court's ruling. See Oklahoma Department of Securities v Wilcox, 2010 WL 567988, *4 (WD Okla
2010). The Wilcoxes subsequently appealed.
5 See Mark A. McDermott, Ponzi Schemes and the Law of Fraudulentand Preferential Transfers, 72 Am Bankr L J 157, 186-88 (1998).
8 11 USC § 727.
7
See, for example, 11 USC § 523(a).
8 See 11 USC § 523(a)(2) (excepting debts obtained through false pretenses, false
representations, actual fraud, or materially false written statements); 11 USC
§ 523(a)(4) (excepting debts "for fraud or defalcation while acting in a fiduciary capacity"); 11 USC § 523(a)(6) (excepting debts "for willful and malicious injury").
9 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub L No 107-204, 116 Stat 745.
10 Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 803(3), 116 Stat at 801, codified at 11 USC § 523(a)(19).
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violators directly, or does it also apply to the debts of third parties that indirectly benefit from a securities violation?
Several courts have dealt with this issue, appealing to statutory text, legislative intent, and general policy considerations.
This Comment takes a different tack, starting from the premise
that the right of discharge functions to allocate risk between
debtors and creditors. Part I of the Comment gives some background about the right of individual discharge, reviewing the
moral and economic justifications for discharge. The securities
violation exception to discharge is described in Part II, and the
approaches that courts take to the problem of third-party securities debtors is outlined in Part III. Part IV offers an alternative
approach to the problem. The aim of third-party securities liability is deterrence-limiting the damage that results from securities violations by giving third parties an incentive to put a stop
to them before losses mount. Thus, third-party securities violation debts should be nondischargeable in bankruptcy. The approach outlined in this Comment is consistent with both the
risk-allocation function of bankruptcy law and Sarbanes-Oxley's
strategy of enlisting third-party gatekeepers to prevent securities violations.
I. THE RIGHT OF INDIVIDUAL DISCHARGE
Discharge, which frees an individual debtor's future assets
from debts incurred prior to bankruptcy, is a resident alien of
the Bankruptcy Code. On the one hand, the bankruptcy process
has little to do with the substantive rights of creditors and debtors; its primary function has historically been to create a forum
for the orderly allocation of a debtor's assets among its creditors." That function is conceptually distinct from, and does not
directly implicate, whether those creditors should be able to
reach a debtor's future assets.12 Discharge can be granted without a collective distribution process; a collective process can also
distribute assets without granting discharge. Indeed, when England's first bankruptcy statute was passed in 1542, no right of
discharge was included, and none would be introduced until
1705.13
11 See Thomas H. Jackson, The Fresh-Start Policy in Bankruptcy Law, 98 Harv L
Rev 1393, 1395-96 (1985).
12 See id at 1396.
13 See Margaret Howard, A Theory of Discharge in Consumer Bankruptcy, 48 Ohio
St L J 1047, 1049 (1987).
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On the other hand, the right of discharge has, ever since its
introduction, been embedded in bankruptcy law.4 There is a
good historical reason for this association: when it was first introduced, discharge was intended to give the individual debtor
an incentive to cooperate in the discovery and distribution of his
assets, thereby facilitating bankruptcy's collection function.1
There is also a good practical reason for it. Debtors who are allowed to discharge debts in exchange for surrendering certain
assets will only do so if those debts exceed the value of the surrendered assets. In such circumstances, collection rules that set
the stage for a costly race to the debtor's assets are a poor fit:
creditors want to ensure both that they all share in the debtor's
assets and that their individual collection actions do not decrease the overall value of those assets.16 Bankruptcy's collective
process is designed to achieve both aims by coordinating creditors' recovery efforts.' Accordingly, it is an appropriate process

once a debtor decides to exercise his discharge right.18
While these considerations explain discharge's place in
bankruptcy law, they do not explain the nature and scope of that
right.19 Scholars have attempted to explain the present contours
of the discharge right by appealing to two different kinds of considerations: moral and economic.20 The moral explanation for
discharge is grounded in the idea that the honest but unfortunate debtor is entitled to continue free from liabilities incurred
in the past.2' The economic explanation, by contrast, argues that
granting debtors a right of discharge-which shifts much of the
risk of credit from debtors to creditors-is warranted on efficiency grounds.22
A. Moral Theory of Discharge
The watchword of bankruptcy rhetoric is that the purpose of
discharge is to "relieve the honest debtor from the weight of
See id.
See id at 1049-50.
See Jackson, 98 Harv L Rev at 1396 (cited in note 11).
17 See id.
18 See id.
19 See id at 1396-97.
20 See Adam J. Hirsch, Inheritance and Bankruptcy: The Meaning of the "Fresh
Start", 45 Hastings L J 175, 202-07 nn 87-97 (1994) (cataloguing different theories of
discharge).
21 See Howard, 48 Ohio St L J at 1050-57 (cited in note 13).
22 See Jackson, 98 Harv L Rev at 1398-1404 (cited in note 11).
14
's
16
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oppressive indebtedness and permit him to start afresh free
from the obligations and responsibilities consequent upon business misfortunes."23 This statement can be understood as a succinct expression of the moral theory of discharge: that the honest
but unfortunate debtor deserves a fresh start, and therefore
ought to be able to place his future income beyond the reach of
his prebankruptcy creditors.
Proponents of the moral theory of discharge find support for
their theory in the various exceptions to discharge codified in
bankruptcy law. For example, debtors-even if they have not
committed any wrongdoing-cannot obtain a discharge if they
have received one within the previous six years. 24 This provision
can be understood to embody a moral presumption that the
debtor who seeks to obtain two discharges in a six-year period is
so financially irresponsible so as to be undeserving of a fresh
start. 25
The moral theory of discharge is perhaps best reflected in
bankruptcy law's distinction between honest (and therefore worthy) debtors, and dishonest (unworthy) debtors. This distinction
appears in two different contexts. One has been referred to as
"procedural" honesty and relates to how the debtor behaves in
the context of the bankruptcy proceeding itself: whether the
debtor is forthright in the process of identifying, collecting, and
distributing her assets. 26 Bankruptcy law treats the procedurally
dishonest debtor harshly, by denying discharge outright to debtors who, among other things, intentionally conceal property affected by the bankruptcy, unjustifiably fail to keep adequate
records, or knowingly make false oaths.27
Debtors can also exhibit "substantive" dishonesty or unworthiness by engaging in misconduct outside the bankruptcy
process itself but that later gives rise to claims in bankruptcy.28
On the moral theory of discharge, debtors who are substantively

23 Local Loan Co v Hunt, 292 US 234, 244 (1934), quoting Williams v United States
Fidelityand Guaranty Co, 236 US 549, 554-55 (1915).
24 11 USC § 727(a)(9). This exception does not apply: (1) if the prior discharge was
granted under Chapter 13 and 100 percent of the unsecured claims were paid in the prior case; or (2) if 70 percent of the unsecured claims were paid, the repayment plan was
proposed by the debtor in good faith, and it was the debtor's best effort. See 11 USC
§ 727(a)(9).
25 Howard, 48 Ohio St L J at 1052 (cited in note 13).
26 See id at 1053.
27 See 11 USC § 727(a). See also Howard, 48 Ohio St L J at 1053-54 (cited in note 13).
28 Howard, 48 Ohio St L J at 1054 (cited in note 13).
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unworthy are also not entitled to discharge.29 Thus the Bankruptcy Commission's recommendation that
[c]laims arising from conduct of the debtor egregiously violating community standards, such as claims for fraud, larceny, embezzlement, willful and malicious wrongs, and civil
penalties, should not be discharged because social policy directs, impliedly at least, that the debtor should not be able
to escape his responsibility through the bankruptcy process.30
This view is reflected in certain debt-specific exceptions to discharge, including those that exempt from discharge debts for
willful and malicious torts, 31 for damages resulting from drunk
driving,32 and for fraud or embezzlement.33 Rather than denying
discharge to the substantively unworthy debtor outright, these
exceptions deny discharge only with respect to those debts that
result from the debtor's wrongdoing.
However, as an explanatory theory of the scope and contours of the discharge right, the moral theory falls short. It offers little guidance as to when wrongdoing is severe enough to
warrant denial of discharge. At the extremes, answers are clear
enough: a debtor who acts with willful intent to defraud should
be denied discharge, but the naive optimist who simply overestimates his chances of repaying his debt should probably not be.
But "[w]hether debtor misconduct exists in [discharge] cases
seems a matter of the eye of the beholder."3< What about the negligent debtor who fails to exercise reasonable care in conducting
his financial affairs? Or the reckless debtor who recognizes the
likelihood that he will not repay his debts but takes them on
regardless?36
Moreover, the moral theory does not explain why bankruptcy law does not deny discharge in certain clear-cut cases of debtor wrongdoing. For instance, debts obtained through fraud are
nondischargeable-but only if the creditor reasonably, or justifiably,
See id.
Report of the Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States, HR Rep
No 93-137, 93d Cong, 1st Sess 79 (1973).
31 See 11 USC § 523(a)(6).
32 See 11 USC § 523(a)(9).
33 See 11 USC §523(a)(4). See also Howard, 48 Ohio St L J at 1054 (cited in note 13).
34 Howard, 48 Ohio St L J at 1054 (cited in note 13).
35 See id. See also Theodore Eisenberg, Bankruptcy Law in Perspective, 28 UCLA L
Rev 953, 979-80 (1981) (arguing that the Bankruptcy Code fails to account for differences in blameworthiness between debtors).
29
30
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relied on the debtor's fraud. Section 523(a)(2)(B) provides that
debts obtained through false written statements about the debtor's financial condition are only excluded from discharge if the
creditor to whom the debt is owed reasonably relied on those
false statements.36 Similarly, the Supreme Court has read
§ 523(a)(2)(A) to mean that debts obtained through other false
representations are nondischargeable only if the creditor justifiably relied on those representations.37 Accordingly, if the creditor unreasonably or unjustifiably relied on the debtor's misinformation, the debt remains dischargeable despite the debtor's
misconduct.38 The economic theory of discharge attempts to resolve these questions.9
B.

Economic Theory of Discharge

Unlike the moral theory of discharge, the economic theory
does not attempt to distinguish among debtors on the basis of
their moral worthiness. Instead, it distinguishes among them
based on their ability to bear the risk of default. On this account,
discharge functions analogously to excuse doctrine in contract
law.40 Excuse doctrine allows someone who has made an enforceable promise not to perform on that promise in the event of
certain unforeseen circumstances.41 Economic analysis of contract law suggests that, when applying excuse doctrine, courts
should impose the risk of extraordinary events on the party to
the contract best able to bear that risk, because that is what rational contracting parties would have agreed to in the first
place.42 This rule saves the parties to the contract the costs of
negotiating and formalizing an agreement regarding unforeseen
36

See 11 USC

§ 523(a)(2)(B).

37 See Field v Mans, 516 US 59, 74-75 (1995) ("[W]e hold that § 523(a)(2)(A) requires justifiable, but not reasonable, reliance.").
38 See Linn K. Twinem, Bankruptcy Report: Some Limitations on Creditors'Rights,
29 Bus Law 353, 362 (1974).
39 The moral theory of discharge also does not explain why the right of discharge
cannot be bargained away-why presumptively honest debtors cannot forgo the right to
discharge in exchange for easier access to credit. See In re Gurrola,328 Bankr 158, 170
(BAP 9th Cir 2005) ("[The defense of discharge in bankruptcy is now an absolute,
nonwaivable defense.").
40 See Robert A. Hillman, Contract Excuse and Bankruptcy Discharge, 43 Stan L
Rev 99, 102-10 (1990).
41 See id at 102-06.
42 See Richard A. Posner and Andrew M. Rosenfield, Impossibility and Related Doctrines in Contract Law: An Economic Analysis, 6 J Legal Stud 83, 90 (1977). For an example of a court applying this approach, see Foster Wheeler Corp v United States, 513
F2d 588, 598 (Ct Cl 1975).
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events in advance.43 Discharge functions similarly by excusing
debtors from payment in the event of default: it imposes the
risks of extending credit on creditors, who are better able to bear
it.44

1. The risk-allocation justification for discharge.
"A particular party is the superior risk bearer either because it is better positioned to prevent the risk from occurring or
because it can better insure against that risk."4 Creditors of an
individual debtor-usually also creditors of many individual
debtors-gain experience through repeated interactions with
debtors, and may therefore be better than any particular debtor
at appraising the risks of extending credit to that debtor and
monitoring his borrowing.46 In addition, debtors might be systematically worse at assessing and acting on those risks on account of: (1) the social externalities of default and (2) behavioral
and cognitive biases that lead individuals to underestimate the
risks of credit.47
Default does not just impose costs on individual debtors; it
imposes costs both on family and friends that are dependent on
the debtor and on society in general. Family members and
friends who rely on the debtor for support are directly harmed
when the debtor can no longer support them.4 More broadly, society is harmed when an insolvent debtor is forced to take

See Posner and Rosenfield, 6 J Legal Stud at 88-89 (cited in note 42).
See Jackson, 98 Harv L Rev at 1400 (cited in note 11). The analogy to excuse doctrine only goes so far. After all, excuse doctrine is only a default rule; parties to a contract can agree to disregard excuse doctrine and shift the risk of a particular event, or of
unforeseen events generally, onto one party or another. Debtors and creditors, by contrast, cannot contract around the right of discharge.
Note that debtors may want to waive the right of discharge in order to gain access to
cheaper credit. Economic analysis suggests that the effect of mandated discharge should
be higher interest rates and less borrowing than there otherwise would be. See Lawrence
H. Summers, Some Simple Economics of Mandated Benefits, 79 Am Econ Rev 177, 178
(1989); Jackson, 98 Harv L Rev at 1427 n 111 (cited in note 11). However, endowment
effects might complicate that prediction: debtors may attach more value to discharge
once it has been mandated, which would partially mitigate the effect of higher rates on
willingness to borrow. See Jonathan Gruber, The Incidence of Mandated Maternity Benefits, 84 Am Econ Rev 622, 630-37 (1994); Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein, and Richard
Thaler, A BehavioralApproach to Law and Economics, 50 Stan L Rev 1471, 1506 (1998).
45 Margaret Howard, Shifting Risk and Fixing Blame: The Vexing Problem of Credit Card Obligations in Bankruptcy, 75 Am Bankr L J 63, 81 (2001).
46 See Jackson, 98 Harv L Rev at 1400 (cited in note 11).
4
See id at 1405.
48 See id at 1419.
4

44
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advantage of the social safety net, or when he shifts his energies
and resources from productive work to leisure-which his creditors cannot reach.4@ When deciding whether to take on additional
debt, the individual debtor-even if he is perfectly individually
rational-may not take these costs into account.
Perhaps more significantly, debtors are not fully rationalthey suffer from well-documented cognitive and behavioral biases. People are known to exhibit a persistent tendency to underestimate future risks.50 What's more, even if they do fully appreciate the future risks associated with a certain course of
currently gratifying behavior, they fail to control the impulses
that favor current gratification. 5 Instead, they exhibit consistent preferences for current over future consumption (in a
way that cannot be fully explained by the rational tendency to
discount future benefits).52 The inability both to appreciate future risks and to give future risks their due weight by deferring
gratification might lead individuals to choose the current consumption benefits of credit even when those benefits are outweighed by credit's future costs.5 Creditors are thus better positioned to prevent debtors from overburdening themselves with
debt and becoming insolvent.
Creditors are also better able than individual debtors to insure against risk through diversification. Although individual
debtors are able to limit their exposure to risk by investing capital in various assets, the majority of their capital is inevitably
their human capital-their ability to earn income in the future-which cannot be easily diversified.54 Creditors, by contrast, are able to diversify by distributing risk among their various debtors. Thus, they are also lower-cost insurers than

49

See id at 1420.
See Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman, Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, 185 Science 1124, 1129 (1974).
51 See Jay V. Solnick, et al, An Experimental Analysis of Impulsivity and Impulse
Control in Humans, 11 Learning & Motivation 61, 74-76 (1980).
52 See Jackson, 98 Harv L Rev at 1408-10 (cited in note 11).
53 See id at 1408-14. Professor Jackson argues that the nonwaivability of discharge
can also be explained by appealing to these factors. For the same reasons that debtors
are likely to underestimate the costs of taking on debt, they are likely to underestimate
the costs of waiving their discharge right. By mandating the availability of a nonwaivable discharge right-thereby encouraging creditors to monitor debtor borrowingbankruptcy law approximates the decision that fully rational debtors concerned with
maximizing overall welfare would make. See id at 1405-24.
54 See id at 1400.
50
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individual debtors55 As superior risk bearers to debtors, creditors ought to bear the risks of credit; discharge shifts those risks
from individual debtors to creditors.56
2. Debt-specific exceptions to discharge.
The risk-allocation theory of discharge also explains the
shape of the discharge right, by making sense of some of the
debt-specific exceptions to discharge. For example, § 523(a)(2)
excepts from discharge debts that were obtained through false
statements or fraud.57 While creditors may normally be better
than debtors at bearing the risks of credit, this is not the case
when a debtor intentionally conceals information regarding the
debt from his creditor. In those circumstances, the debtor is better positioned than the creditor to bear the risks associated with
default.58 It therefore makes sense to impose the cost of default
on the debtor rather than the creditor, by excepting from discharge any debt obtained through fraud.69

See Howard, 75 Am Bankr L J at 80-81 (cited in note 45).
While creditors are superior risk bearers ex ante, debtors might be better at
avoiding risk ex post-better positioned to minimize the prospect of insolvency once credit has been extended. Accordingly, the availability of discharge might give rise to concerns about moral hazard: shifting the cost of insolvency from debtors to creditors disincentivizes debtors from taking what steps they can to avoid insolvency after credit is
extended. However, while discharge shifts some of the costs of default to creditors, it
does not shift all of them: discharge is not available in the case of certain kinds of debtor
misbehavior, such as fraud. See id at 84. Obtaining discharge is also costly for debtors:
(1) in order to exercise their discharge right, debtors must surrender their nonexempt
assets (which can be worth more to the debtors than to creditors) and (2) by exercising
their discharge right, debtors put future creditors on notice (for example, through a lower credit score) that they might exercise it again, thereby reducing their access to future
credit. See Jackson, 98 Harv L Rev at 1426-27 (cited in note 11). Creditors can also protect themselves against the moral hazard created by discharge by setting the criteria
that debtors must satisfy in order to qualify for loans and by monitoring borrowers for
changes in their financial condition that would implicate future lending decisions. See
Howard, 75 Am Bankr L J at 84 (cited in note 45). Further, discharge operates against
the backdrop of moral hazard that results from the availability of social insurance programs. The knowledge that social insurance programs are available induces the individual debtor to underestimate the true costs of his decisions. By encouraging creditors to
police extensions of credit, the right of discharge minimizes this already-existing moral
hazard created by social insurance programs. See Jackson, 98 Harv L Rev at 1402 (cited
in note 11).
57 11 USC § 523(a)(2).
58 See In re Leventhal, 194 Bankr 26, 30 (Bankr SDNY 1996) (rejecting the "assumption of risk" theory in circumstances where a debtor obtained credit by means of
fraud); Howard, 75 Am Bankr L J at 80 (cited in note 45).
59 See Howard, 75 Am Bankr L J at 80 (cited in note 45).
55

56
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However, we have already encountered an exception to this
general rule. Debts obtained through fraud are nondischargeable only if the creditor reasonably, or justifiably, relied on the
debtor's fraud. As we have already noted, the moral theory of
discharge-which explains the availability of discharge based on
the debtor's worthiness-has no satisfactory explanation for why
the fraudulent debtor can take advantage of the discharge right
when his creditors relied on him unreasonably or unjustifiably.
But the economic theory of discharge does. The purpose of
discharge, according to the risk-allocation account, is to incentivize creditors to monitor the risks taken by their debtors by shifting those risks from debtors to creditors. A rule that rewarded
any creditor who innocently relied on a debtor's misrepresentations would create a disincentive for creditors to investigate the
creditworthiness of potential borrowers carefully-it would encourage them "not to look beyond [the debtor's] representations
to other sources of information about the debtor's ability to repay."60 By contrast, the actual rule-which only rewards creditors who reasonably or justifiably relied on a debtor's misrepresentations-ensures that the fraud exception does not eliminate
creditors' incentive to monitor.
Consider another debt-specific exception to discharge:
§ 523(a)(8) provides that, subject to certain exceptions, student
loans are nondischargeable in bankruptcy.1 This means that by
taking out student loans in order to finance their educationsthat is, to finance the acquisition of human capital-students effectively designate some portion of their future earnings to repaying those loans without any recourse in bankruptcy.62 But
unlike other decisions to take on debt, the decision to take on
debt to acquire human capital does not seem to indicate an irrational preference for present consumption over future consumption. If anything, it reflects the opposite-a desire to favor the
future over the present.63 In other words, the presumption that

60 Id at 131, quoting Luther Zeigler, Note, The Fraud Exception to Discharge in
Bankruptcy: A Reappraisal,38 Stan L Rev 891, 907 (1986).
61 11 USC § 523(a)(8).
62 See Jackson, 98 Harv L Rev at 1430-31 n 121 (cited in note 11).
63 See id. But see generally Note, Ending Student Loan Exceptionalism: The Case
for Risk-Based Pricingand Dischargeability,126 Harv L Rev 587 (2012) (questioning the
presumption that most students will be able to repay their student loans and arguing for
the repeal of § 523(a)(8)).
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warrants making other kinds of individual debt dischargeable in
bankruptcy does not apply to student loan debt.64
II. SECTION 523(A)(19): THE SECURITIES VIOLATION EXCEPTION
In response to the high-profile scandals at Enron and other
large, publicly traded companies, Congress passed the SarbanesOxley Act.65 Sarbanes-Oxley created new securities-law violations and toughened penalties for previously existing violations.66 Moreover, it gave the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) broad latitude to regulate the activities of
gatekeepers-parties like lawyers, auditors, underwriters, lenders, and stock analysts, who sell products or provide services
that are necessary for others wishing to enter a market or engage in certain activities.67 Specifically, Sarbanes-Oxley directs
the SEC to promulgate rules governing auditor and stock analyst independence and requiring lawyers to report wrongdoing
by public companies.68 These requirements are aimed at harnessing the power of gatekeepers by enlisting them to monitor
for and thereby prevent securities violations.69
In addition to effecting substantive changes in securities
law, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act also amended the Bankruptcy
Code. Following the Enron debacle, executives who had been
aware of the ongoing fraud were able to escape debts incurred
through violations of securities law by filing for bankruptcy and
having those debts discharged.7o To close this loophole, the Sar-

banes-Oxley Act added a provision to § 523(a) that makes debt

64 See Jackson, 98 Harv L Rev at 1430-31 n 121 (cited in note 11).
65 Sarbanes-Oxley, 116 Stat at 745.
66 See Michael A. Perino, Enron's Legislative Aftermath: Some Reflections on the
DeterrenceAspects of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 76 St John's L Rev 671, 676 (2002).
67 See Peter B. Oh, Gatekeeping, 29 J Corp L 735, 766 (2004). See also Reinier H.
Kraakman, Gatekeepers: The Anatomy of a Third-Party Enforcement Strategy, 2 J L,
Econ, & Org 53, 53-55 (1986) (defining "gatekeepers" as those "who are able to disrupt
misconduct by withholding their cooperation from wrongdoers").
68 See Lawrence A. Cunningham, The Sarbanes-Oxley Yawn: Heavy Rhetoric, Light
Reform (and It Just Might Work), 35 Conn L Rev 915, 943-46, 970-71, 966-68 (2003).
69 See Assaf Hamdani, Gatekeeper Liability, 77 S Cal L Rev 53, 86-88 (2003).
70
See The Corporate and Criminal Fraud Accountability Act of 2002, S Rep No
107-146, 107th Cong, 2d Sess 10 (2002). Many executives were also able to take advantage of Texas's liberal property exemption rules, which allow debtors to shield the
full value of their homes from creditors. In doing so, they placed their multimillion- dollar
mansions outside the reach of defrauded investors. See Nelson S. Ebaugh, The Securities
Claim Exemption in Bankruptcy: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly, 19 Sec Litig J 14, 15
(Fall 2008).

2013]

Dischargeof Third-PartySecurities Violation Debts

1933

incurred for securities violations nondischargeable in bankruptcy.71
Section 523(a)(19) currently provides,72 in relevant part, that an
individual debtor cannot discharge a debt:
(19) that(A) is for(i) the violation of any of the Federal securities
laws (as that term is defined in section 3(a)(47)
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934), any of
the State securities laws, or any regulation or
order issued under such Federal or State securities laws; or
(ii) common law fraud, deceit, or manipulation in
connection with the purchase or sale of any security; and
(B) results, before, on, or after the date on which the petition was filed, from(i) any judgment, order, consent order, or decree
entered in any Federal or State judicial or administrative proceeding;
(ii) any settlement agreement entered into by the
debtor; or
(iii) any court or administrative order for any damages, fine, penalty, citation, restitutionary payment, disgorgement payment, attorney fee, cost,
or other payment owed by the debtor73
While in many ways similar to the § 523(a)(2) exception for
debts incurred through fraud, this provision expands upon that
exemption both substantively and procedurally. Perhaps the
most notable substantive expansion is that the securities violation exception enables some defrauded investors to secure nondischargeable judgments without proving that the debtor had
any knowledge of wrongdoing.74 Common law fraud claims of the
kind that would qualify for the § 523(a)(2) exception require

71 Sarbanes-Oxley § 803(3), 116 Stat at 801.
72 The provision was amended by § 1404(a) of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention
and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 to clarify that it even covers debts recoverable under a securities claim that had not been reduced to judgment before the debtor filed for
bankruptcy. Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005
§ 1404(a), Pub L No 109-8, 119 Stat 23, 215.
73 11 USC § 523(a)(19).
74 See Ebaugh, 19 Sec Litig J at 14 (cited in note 70).
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proof of scienter.76 Accordingly, securing a nondischargeable debt
for fraud requires proof that the fraudulent debtor knew about
the falsity of his misrepresentations.76 In contrast, securities law
imposes strict liability for several violations: For instance, the
Securities Act of 193377 imposes strict liability on a securities issuer in the event that a registration statement contains a material misrepresentation or omission78 In addition, the same Securities Act makes someone strictly liable for misrepresentations
or omissions made in, or about, a prospectus.79 Finally, states
that have adopted the Revised Uniform Securities Act of 198580
impose strict liability on sellers of securities who are not licensed brokers,8i who sell unregistered securities,82 or who make

misrepresentations or omissions in the course of a sale.83 Thus, a
creditor who wants to secure a nondischargeable judgment for a
securities violation under § 523(a)(19) need not necessarily
prove that the violator knew, or even was negligently ignorant,
of the violation.84 Indeed, several courts have found debts for

75 See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 526 (1977):
A misrepresentation is fraudulent if the maker (a) knows or believes that the
matter is not as he represents it to be, (b) does not have the confidence in the
accuracy of his representation that he states or implies, or (c) knows that he
does not have the basis for his representation that he states or implies.
76 See, for example, Palmacci v Umpierrez, 121 F3d 781, 787 (1st Cir 1997) (explaining that a debtor makes a false representation when he does not intend to perform
his promise, but not when he decides at a later point not to follow through); In re
McGuire, 284 Bankr 481, 490 (Bankr D Colo 2002) (holding that a debt for violation of
federal securities law does not qualify for the § 523(a)(2)(A) exception for fraud debts absent a showing of fraudulent intent).
77 Pub L No 73-22, 48 Stat 74, codified as amended at 15 USC § 77a et seq.
78
Securities Act of 1933 § 11(a), 48 Stat at 82, codified at 15 USC § 77k. See also
Herman & MacLean v Huddleston, 459 US 375, 382 (1983).
79
Securities Act of 1933 § 12(2), 48 Stat at 84, codified at 15 USC § 771(a)(2). See
also Wigand v Flo-Tek, Inc, 609 F2d 1028, 1034 (2d Cir 1979).
s0 Colorado, Idaho, Iowa, Maine, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, Rhode Island, and
the District of Columbia have adopted the Revised Uniform Securities Act of 1985. See
Uniform Business and FinancialLaws Locator (Legal Information Institute Apr 2003),
online at http://www.law.cornell.edu/uniform/vol7.html#secur (visited Nov 24, 2013).
81 See Revised Uniform Securities Act (RUSA) § 201.
82 See RUSA § 301.
83 See RUSA § 501(2).
84 See RUSA § 605(a)-(b) (imposing strict liability on unlicensed brokers and sellers
of unregistered securities, and negligence liability for misstatements and omissions in
disclosures made to buyers of securities).
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strict liability securities violations nondischargeable in
bankruptcy.85
Moreover, the provision added by Sarbanes-Oxley substantively expands the scope of nondischargeability even for those
securities violation debts that do require proof of the debtor's
knowledge. Under § 523(a)(2), defrauded investors seeking nondischargeable judgments for fraudulent violations of securities
law must prove that they actually relied on the debtor's fraudulent misrepresentations.86 The addition of § 523(a)(19), which
renders all debts for securities violations nondischargeable,
eliminates the requirement for actual reliance by incorporating
securities law's fraud-on-the-market doctrine into the standard
for nondischargeable debts.87 Fraud-on-the-market doctrine allows a purchaser of securities to sustain a cause of action for
misrepresentations regarding the sale or purchase of a security
without proving actual reliance; all the purchaser must show is
that the seller made a material misrepresentation and that
market prices reacted to that misrepresentation. Accordingly,
under § 523(a)(19) a debtor's misleading statement regarding
the purchase or sale of a security is sufficient to render the resulting debt nondischargeable, even absent the creditor's actual
reliance or even knowledge of a false statement.8 8
Section 523(a)(19) also makes it procedurally easier to secure a nondischargeable fraud judgment. To ensure that a debtor cannot discharge a fraud debt under § 523(a)(2), a creditor
must file a complaint objecting to dischargeability within sixty
days after the first date set for the meeting of creditors.89 If she
does not, she waives her right to obtain a nondischargeability
85 See, for example, In re Williams, 370 Bankr 397, 401-02 (Bankr MD Fla 2007)
(holding a debt for the sale of an unregistered security nondischargeable in bankruptcy);
In re Civiello, 348 Bankr 459, 464 (Bankr ND Ohio 2006).
86 See 11 USC § 523(a)(2). See also Field v Mans, 516 US 59, 73-75 (1995) (ruling
that a creditor must have justifiably relied on a debtor's fraudulent misrepresentation in
order for a fraud debt to be nondischargeable under § 523(a)(2)(A)).
87 See Lucian Murley, Note, Closing a Bankruptcy Loop-Hole or Impairing a Debtor's Fresh Start? Sarbanes-Oxley Creates a New Exception to Discharge, 92 Ky L J 317,
330-31 (2003-2004) (noting that § 523(a)(19) adopts fraud-on-the-market theory). See
also Basic Inc v Levinson, 485 US 224, 241-48 (1988) (ruling that the fraud-on-themarket theory can create a rebuttable presumption of reliance with respect to violations
of Rule 10b-5, the SEC rule prohibiting fraud or deceit in connection with the purchase
or sale of securities); Thomas Lee Hazen, The Law of Securities Regulation 812 (West 3d
ed 1996) (noting that fraud-on-the-market theory allows a plaintiff to satisfy Rule 10b-5's
reliance requirement absent actual reliance).
88 See Murley, Note, 92 Ky L J at 329-31 (cited in note 87).
89 FRBP 4007(c).
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order. Some jurisdictions enforce this rule even if the court
failed to give the required notice of the sixty-day deadline.90
However, § 523(a)(19) does not contain such a filing deadline.91
Accordingly, a creditor that fails to file a complaint seeking nondischargeability of a fraud debt under § 523(a)(2) would still be
able to file a complaint under § 523(a)(19) if the fraud is in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.92
By amending § 523(a) to include an exception to discharge
for securities violations, Congress also sought to remedy a situation that forced regulators to "plow the same ground twice in securities fraud cases."9> Prior to the addition of § 523(a)(19), state
regulators were often forced to relitigate fraud cases in bankruptcy court to prevent discharge because of technical differences between remedial statutes and their analogous common
law causes of action. In addition, settlements were not given the
same collateral estoppel effect in bankruptcy court as judgments
obtained through fully litigated proceedings.94 Section
523(a)(19), which renders debts for securities violations nondischargeable, was intended to solve the problem of translation between remedial statutes and the common law.96 Further, by explicitly including debts resulting from "any settlement
agreement entered into by the debtor,"96 the securities violation
provision makes it easier to obtain a nondischargeability judgment when the initial case on which the debt was based was not
fully litigated.97
While the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in general-and the securities violation discharge exception in particular-was targeted at
preventing high-profile securities violations, its impact is much
wider in scope. As part of its expansion of gatekeeper liability,

90 See Neeley v Murchison, 815 F2d 345, 345 (5th Cir 1987) (holding that a bankruptcy clerk's failure to provide notice of the dischargeability bar deadline did not suspend the fixed limitation period for filing a dischargeability complaint). But see In re
Maughan, 340 F3d 337, 342-44 (6th Cir 2003) (ruling that a bankruptcy court did not
abuse its discretion in allowing a creditor to file his dischargeability complaint after the
sixty-day deadline given the debtor's failure to comply with the court's order to turn over
documentation).
91 See FRBP 4007(b).
92 See In re Kilroy, 354 Bankr 476, 486 (Bankr SD Tex 2006).
93 S Rep No 107-146 at 10 (cited in note 70).
94 See id.
95 See id.
96 11 USC § 523(a)(19)(B)(ii).
97 See Andrew L. Van Houter, Comment, Reopening the Loophole: Avoiding Securities FraudDebt through Bankruptcy, 42 Seton Hall L Rev 1713, 1736 (2012).
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Sarbanes-Oxley imposes broad duties on the management of
companies to monitor various transactions, increasing the ability of shareholders to hold managers personally liable under
federal securities laws for failure to do so. 9 8 The provision excepting debts for securities violations from discharge ensures
that debts arising out of violations of these duties are nondischargeable in bankruptcy.99
Similarly, Sarbanes-Oxley gives the SEC regulatory authority to discipline any person whom it finds "to have willfully violated, or willfully aided and abetted the violation of, any provision of the securities laws or the rules and regulations issued
thereunder."100 It also requires the SEC to issue rules setting
forth minimum standards of professional conduct for attorneys
appearing and practicing before the SEC, including a requirement to report any evidence of a material violation of securities
law or breach of fiduciary duty by a company to the chief legal
counsel of the company, its chief executive officer, or its board of
directors.101 The provision excepting debts for securities violations from discharge ensures that attorneys who violate these
standards cannot discharge debts that result from those violations in bankruptcy.102
Although Congress may have intended § 523(a)(19) to cover
the hypothetical situation in which the corporate executives responsible for a major public securities scandal-or their lawyers-attempt to seek refuge in bankruptcy, the more common
case is one in which a small-time securities violator, like an individual broker, is found guilty of a securities violation and then
files for bankruptcy when overwhelmed by the magnitude of the
penalty.103

98 See Steve H. Nickles, Behavioral Effect of New Bankruptcy Law on Management
and Lawyers: Collage of Recent Statutes and Cases DiscouragingChapter11 Bankruptcy,
59 Ark L Rev 329, 425-27 (2006); Lisa M. Fairfax, Spare the Rod, Spoil the Director?Revitalizing Directors'FiduciaryDuty through Legal Liability, 42 Houston L Rev 393, 420
(2005).
99 See Nickles, 59 Ark L Rev at 428 (cited in note 98).
100 15 USC § 78d-3.
101 15 USC § 7245.
102 See Nickles, 59 Ark L Rev at 428 (cited in note 98).
103 See, for example, In re Gibbons, 289 Bankr 588, 590 (Bankr SDNY 2003); Securities Investor Protection Corp v R.D. Kushnir & Co, 267 Bankr 819, 822-25 (Bankr ND Ill
2001). See also Kelli A. Alces, Moving toward a FederalLaw of Corporate Governance in
Bankruptcy, 31 SIU L J 621, 630 (2007); Murley, Note, 92 Ky L J at 338 (cited in note
87).

The University of Chicago Law Review

1938

[80:1921

III. THIRD-PARTY DEBTORS AND § 523(A)(19)'S SECURITIES
VIOLATION EXCEPTION: CURRENT APPROACHES
Recall the Wilcoxes, investors in a Ponzi scheme who were
required to disgorge their profits from the scheme. When the
Wilcoxes attempted to discharge their disgorgement debts in
bankruptcy, the Oklahoma Department of Securities brought an
adversary proceeding, arguing that the Wilcoxes could not discharge their debts because the debts were for a securities violation within the meaning of § 523(a)(19).104 This raised a problem
of interpretation for the court: Does the discharge exception for
securities violations apply only to debts of those who committed
the violations or also to debts of third parties that result from
the securities violations of others? Courts faced with this issue
have advanced arguments based on statutory language, legislative history, and considerations of public policy.
Statutory Construction

A.

Section 523(a)(19) provides that a debtor cannot discharge a
debt that is "for" a securities violation. Courts have differed over
how to interpret the plain meaning of the statute-specifically,
what it means for a debt to be "for" a securities violation.
In the Ninth Circuit case In re Sherman,0 the court noted
that the plain meaning of "for" is broad: it can plausibly encompass anything from "the penalty on account of' to "in requital
of."106 While the third-party securities violation debtor might be
understood to owe a debt as "the penalty on account of' the securities violation, it cannot be said that that debt is "in requital of'
the securities violation because the debt does not result from the
third party committing any violation.10 The court therefore
ruled that the debt was dischargeable-it didn't fall within the
meaning of § 523(a)(19).108 The dissenting judge argued that in
context, the word "for" means "'because of,' 'on account of,' 'as a
result of,' 'having (the thing mentioned) as a reason or cause."os

104 See Oklahoma Department of Securities v Wilcox, 2010 WL 567988, *1 (WD

Okla).

105 658 F3d 1009 (9th Cir 2011), revd
106 Sherman, 658 F3d at 1013.
107 Id.

10

Id at 1019.
109 Id (Fisher dissenting).

on other grounds, 133 S Ct 1754 (2013).
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This, the judge continued, includes debt owed by a third party
for a securities violation that she did not commit.1o
In the Wilcox case,1 1' the majority ruled that under the plain
meaning of the statute, the debt was not covered by the
§ 523(a)(19) exception. It was not a debt "for a violation" of securities laws; rather it was a debt "for unjust enrichment resulting
from someone else's violation" of securities laws.112 By contrast,
the dissent argued that because the word "for" in this statute
means "[r]epresenting" or "as representative of," third-party securities violation debts are included in the plain meaning of the
statute;113 it is "possible for an obligation-in particular a court
judgment for unjust enrichment-to represent or be representative of a federal or state securities violation committed by someone other than the person against whom the judgment was
entered."114
In addition to dividing on the plain meaning of the word
"for," judges have differed as to how to interpret the absence of
any explicit textual requirement that the underlying securities
violation be committed by the debtor. Courts have noted the contrast with several of the other exceptions to discharge that explicitly target debts resulting from the debtor's conduct.11 The
question is whether the absence of such targeting in § 523(a)(19)
carries any interpretive force.
According to several judges, the omission of "by the debtor"
in § 523(a)(19)(A)(i) demonstrates that it was intended to cover
both debtors who violate securities law themselves and others to
whom the exception might reasonably apply.116 Others, however, have suggested that the omission should not be accorded
110

Sherman, 658 F3d at 1019 (Fisher dissenting).
111 Oklahoma Department of Securities v Wilcox, 691 F3d 1171 (10th Cir 2012).
112 Id at 1175.
113 Id at 1181-82 (Briscoe dissenting), quoting Oxford English Dictionary (2d ed
1989) (online version).
114 Oklahoma Department of Securities, 691 F3d at 1182 (Briscoe dissenting).
"15 See, for example, 11 USC § 523(a)(2)(B) (excepting fraudulent written statements "that the debtor caused to be made or published with intent to deceive"); 11 USC
§ 523(a)(6) (excepting debts "for willful and malicious injury by the debtor to another entity or to the property of another entity"); 11 USC § 523(a)(8)(B) (excepting educational
loans "incurred by a debtor who is an individual"); 11 USC § 523(a)(9) (excepting debts
"for death or personal injury caused by the debtor's operation of a motor vehicle, vessel,
or aircraft [while intoxicated]"); 11 USC § 523(a)(15) (excepting spousal and child support
payments "incurred by the debtor" in the course of divorce or separation proceedings).
116 See Sherman, 658 F3d at 1021 (Fisher dissenting); Wilcox, 691 F3d at 1182
(Briscoe dissenting); Oklahoma Department of Securities v Mathews, 423 Bankr 684, 689
(WD Okla 2010).

The University of Chicago Law Review

1940

[80:1921

interpretive weight. After all, other § 523(a) discharge exceptions make no explicit reference to the debtor's conduct, but they
are still best interpreted (the argument goes) as targeting only
debtors who are also wrongdoers.117 For example, § 523(a)(2)(A)
excepts from discharge debts "for money, property, services, or
an extension, renewal, or refinancing of credit, to the extent obtained by [ ] false pretenses, a false representation, or actual
fraud, other than a statement respecting the debtor's or an insider's financial condition."118 Similarly, § 523(a)(4) excepts from
discharge debts "for fraud or defalcation while acting in a fiduciary capacity, embezzlement, or larceny.""1s While these exceptions do not refer specifically to the debtor's conduct, they are
naturally interpreted as refusing a fresh start only to the dishonest debtor himself. By the same token, § 523(a)(19) should be
interpreted as refusing discharge only to the securities violator
himself, not third-party debtors whose debts resulted from another's securities violation.120
B.

Legislative History

Courts attempting to resolve -the question have also appealed to legislative history. In the Wilcox case, the Tenth Circuit noted that an earlier draft of the securities violation provision "excepted from discharge a judgment that 'arises under a
claim relating to' securities violations." 21 The language was subsequently changed to except only a judgment that "is for" a securities violation.122 This change, the court reasoned, suggests that
Congress intended to limit the reach of the provision, and it
should therefore be interpreted narrowly-to exclude third-party
debtors who owe money as a result of another person's securities
violation.123

117 See Sherman, 658 F3d at 1014 (comparing the securities violation exception to
other discharge exceptions that, while they make no explicit reference to the debtor's
conduct, are "best interpreted as targeting only debtors who are also wrongdoers").
118 11 USC § 523(a)(2).
119 11 USC § 523(a)(4).
120 See Sherman, 658 F3d at 1014. But see In re M.M. Winkler & Associates, 239
F3d 746, 751 (5th Cir 2001) (holding that debt that resulted from the fraud of an innocent party's associate, and for which the innocent party was vicariously liable, was nondischargeable).
121 Wilcox, 691 F3d at 1175, quoting S Rep No 107-146 at 27 (cited in note 70).
122 11 USC § 523(a)(19)(A).
123 Wilcox, 691 F3d at 1175.
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In addition to the textual history of the provision, courts
have looked to the legislative record to shed light on the provision's purpose. At least one court has acknowledged that Congress did not actually anticipate the problem of third-party securities violation debtors.124 Nevertheless, some courts have
searched the legislative record for an indication of what Congress would have intended had it anticipated the question.125

They have noted that the express purpose of the exception was
to ensure that parties who are guilty of securities violations are
penalized in bankruptcy, just like parties who are guilty of similar misconduct.126

These courts have observed that the legislative record "consistently refers to 'hold[ing] accountable those who incur debts
by violating our securities laws' and explains 'the bill protects
victims' rights to recover from those who have cheated them,"'
concluding that it is "evident from the text of § 523(a)(19)(A)
that Congress intended to penalize the perpetrators of such
schemes by denying them relief from their debts."127 If the exception was indeed added to punish securities violators, then it
would follow that it was not added to punish nonviolators. The
punitive justification for making securities debts nondischargeable supports a reading that limits the discharge exception only
to situations in which the debtor personally violated securities
law.128
C. Policy Considerations
The legislative record, however, is ambiguous. As several
judges have noted, the congressional record indicates that the
exception was intended both to "prevent wrongdoers from using
the bankruptcy laws as a shield and to allow defrauded investors to recover as much as possible"-that is, to further goals of
both punishment and compensation.129 Contrary to the purely
punitive justification,13O this dual justification-aiming at both
124
126
126
127

See Sherman, 658 F3d at 1016.
See id; Wilcox, 691 F3d at 1175-76.
See Sherman, 658 F3d at 1016-18; Wilcox, 691 F3d at 1175-77.
Wilcox, 691 F3d at 1175-76 (emphasis omitted). See also Sherman, 658 F3d at

1016.
See Sherman, 658 F3d at 1016; Wilcox, 691 F3d at 1175.
Legislative History of Title VII of HR 2673: The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,
107th Cong, 2d Sess, in 148 Cong Rec S7418 (July 26, 2002). See also Wilcox, 691 F3d at
1175; id at 1182-83 (Briscoe dissenting).
130 See notes 126-28 and accompanying text.
128
129
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punishment and compensation-might support the reading that
a securities violation debt is covered by the discharge exception
even when the debtor did not himself commit the securities
violation. '3

Ultimately, both those who have argued in favor of reading
the securities violation provision narrowly (to exclude thirdparty securities debtors) and those who have argued in favor of
reading the provision broadly (to include third-party securities
debtors) appeal to public policy arguments. Those in favor of
reading the provision narrowly argue that this reading furthers
bankruptcy law's general goal of giving the honest but unfortunate debtor a "fresh start."132 Exceptions to discharge should be
limited to those debtors who seek to abuse the bankruptcy system in order to avoid the consequences of their misconduct. Accordingly, third-party securities violation debtors who have not
committed any misconduct should receive a fresh start.133
Those who contend that the provision should be read broadly argue that this issue implicates more than just bankruptcy
law. While the fresh start policy might militate in favor of a narrow reading, there is more at stake here: securities policy aims
at depriving wrongdoers of unjust enrichment and compensating
defrauded investors by pursuing disgorgement actions against
those who have been unjustly enriched by securities violations.134 Allowing those who have been unjustly enriched
through a securities violation-even if they did not personally
commit the securities violation-to discharge the debts they owe
as a result would frustrate that compensatory purpose. Thus,
third-party securities debtors who have been unjustly enriched
should not be able to discharge their securities-related debtseven if the debts did not arise out of their own wrongdoing.35
IV. A RISK-ALLOCATION APPROACH
Ultimately, both approaches that courts have adopted are
unconvincing; none of the textual, legislative-history, or public

131 See Sherman, 658 F3d at 1016 (evaluating the government's argument); Wilcox,
691 F3d at 1182-83 (Briscoe dissenting).
132 See Sherman, 658 F3d at 1014-15; Wilcox, 691 F3d at 1174.
133 See Sherman, 658 F3d at 1014-15; Wilcox, 691 F3d at 1174.
134 See Sherman, 658 F3d at 1021-24 (Fisher dissenting); Securities and Exchange
Commission v Sherman, 406 Bankr 883, 887 (CD Cal 2009).
135 See Sherman, 658 F3d at 1021-24 (Fisher dissenting); Sherman, 406 Bankr at
887.
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policy arguments clearly point to reading the statute narrowly
or broadly. But courts have also been too quick to reduce the
question to a conflict between bankruptcy policy-ensuring that
the honest debtor gets a "fresh start"-and securities policy.
These approaches take as a given that, as a matter of bankruptcy policy, the innocent third-party debtor is entitled to a fresh
start. But this is not always the case: in other contextsspecifically, cases of vicarious liability-courts have found debts
nondischargeable even though the debtor did not personally engage in the misconduct that qualified them for nondischargeability.136 Close attention to those cases of vicarious liability reveals
their consistency with the broader aim of discharge-to efficiently allocate risk by imposing it on the least-cost avoider-and
suggests a different way of resolving the question at hand.
The question here can therefore be understood not as a conflict between bankruptcy policy and securities policy,137 but as an
internal question of bankruptcy law: Would withholding discharge from third-party securities violation debtors further the
risk-allocation goal of discharge? To the extent that third-party
liability for securities violations is intended to encourage those
third parties to monitor for and report securities violations, the
answer is yes. Indeed, framing the question at hand as one of
risk allocation reveals not conflict, but general consistency, between the risk-allocation aims of bankruptcy law and securities
law-specifically, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act's strategy of enlisting
gatekeepers to prevent securities violations.13

136 See notes 126-28 and accompanying text.
137 See Douglas G. Baird, A World without Bankruptcy, 50 L & Contemp Probs 173,

180-81 (Spring 1987):
One can characterize the issue in [Ohio v Kovacs, 469 US 274 (1985),] as a conflict between environmental law and bankruptcy, but this characterization
may not focus matters as sharply as one that treats the case as a conflict over
whether Kovacs's obligation to the state of Ohio should be treated differently
from his obligation to other creditors . . .

[Tihe proper approach is one of reasoning by analogy, rather than balancing
between "environmental policy" on the one hand and "bankruptcy policy" on
the other.
138 Risk-allocation arguments are by no means foreign to bankruptcy law. For instance, the claims of shareholders alleging fraud in the issuance of stock are subordinated to the claims of general unsecured creditors on the grounds that shareholders are better at bearing both the risks of illegality in the issuance of stock and the risks of
insolvency. See In re Telegroup, Inc, 281 F3d 133, 139 (3d Cir 2002); In re Granite Partners, LP, 208 Bankr 332, 336 (Bankr SDNY 1997).
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Does § 523(a) Require Personal Wrongdoing?

Exceptions to discharge can be divided into two categories.
The first category, type-based exceptions,
relates to public policy matters. Thus, at § 523(a)(1), taxes
are made non-dischargeable; at § 523(a)(3), unlisted debts
are made non-dischargeable; at § 523(a)(5), alimony,
maintenance, and child support obligations are made nondischargeable; at § 523(a)(7), a fine, penalty, or forfeiture to
the government is made non-dischargeable; at § 523(a)(8),
student loans are made non-dischargeable; at § 523(a)(9),
drunk driving debts are made non-dischargeable; and at
§ 523(a)(10), debts surviving a prior bankruptcy are made
non-dischargeable. 139
The second category, fault-based exceptions,
may be characterized as debts which ought not to be dischargeable because they arose from wrongful acts. This category is comprised of those debts set forth at § 523(a)(2),
debts due to false and fraudulent acts; at § 523(a)(4), debts
due to fraud or defalcation of a fiduciary, embezzlement, or
larceny; and § 523(a)(6), debts arising from willful and malicious injury.140

More succinctly, exceptions to discharge can be divided into
debts that are owed to creditors who are thought to be particularly important and debts that arise out of particular wrongful
conduct.
The nondischargeability of type-based exceptions to discharge, like tax debts and child support obligations, does not depend on the personal wrongdoing of the debtor.141 Thus, it should
come as no surprise that courts have found that third-party tax
debtors cannot discharge tax debts in bankruptcy, regardless of
whether they were initially responsible for incurring the tax liability. What matters in those cases is not whether the third party

139 In re Futscher, 58 Bankr 14, 17 (Bankr SD Ohio 1985).
140 Id.
141 See Keith N. Sambur, Note, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act's Effect on Section 523 of the

Bankruptcy Code: Are All Securities Laws Debts Really Nondischargeable?, 11 Am
Bankr Inst L Rev 561, 566 (2003) ("Sometimes, the type of debt that is due determines
the outcome of a discharge proceeding. In these situations, the conduct of the debtor is
irrelevant.").
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incurred the tax liability initially, but whether the liability
ought to still be treated as tax liability.142
Less obvious is whether the same is true for fault-based exceptions to discharge, like those for debts obtained through
fraud or debts for securities violations. But we can hazard a tentative answer. Note that some securities violations are strict liability violations-they give rise to liability even if the violator
did not knowingly or even negligently commit any wrongdoing.148
When the securities violation exception to discharge was first
enacted, commentators differed as to whether it should apply to
strict liability securities violations or not.144 Some argued that
only debts that arise out of culpable conduct-actual wrongdoing-should be nondischargeable in bankruptcy.145 However,
courts have since regularly found debts arising from strict liability securities violations nondischargeable.146 Thus, it is clear
that at least some fault-based exceptions to dischargeincluding § 523(a)(19)-do not depend on the personal wrongdoing of the debtor.
Nevertheless, one might object that although fault-based
exceptions to discharge do not depend on the personal wrongdoing of the debtor, they do depend on the personal violation of the
debtor. That is, although debtors are not able to discharge debts
that arose out of certain nonculpable conduct, it must still be the
case that those debts arose out of their own conduct.
This objection, too, is misguided. Section 523(a)(2)(A) excepts from discharge debts for "money, property, services, or an
extension, renewal, or refinancing of credit, to the extent obtained by [ ] false pretenses, a false representation, or actual
fraud."147 This gives rise to a question similar to the one faced
here: Can an individual debtor discharge debts for someone
142 See, for example, McKowen v InternalRevenue Service, 370 F3d 1023, 1025 (10th
Cir 2004).
143 See notes 77-85 and accompanying text.
144 Compare Jeannette Filippone, Comment, Clearer Skies for Investors: Clearing
Firm Liability under the Uniform Securities Act, 39 San Diego L Rev 1327, 1328 n 4
(2002) (reading § 523(a)(19)(A)(i) to except all debts arising under securities laws from
discharge), with Sambur, Note, 11 Am Bankr Inst L Rev at 568-69 (cited in note 141)
(arguing that § 523(a)(19)(A)(i) only excepts securities violation debts that result from
culpable wrongdoing from discharge).
145 See Sambur, Note, 11 Am Bankr Inst L Rev at 564-66 (cited in note 141).
146 See In re Williams, 370 Bankr 397, 400-02 (Bankr MD Fla 2007); In re Civiello,
348 Bankr 459, 464 (Bankr ND Ohio 2006). See also Ebaugh, 19 Sec Litig J at 14 (cited
in note 70).
147 11 USC § 523(a)(2).
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else's fraud? In the Sixth Circuit case In re Ledford,148 the court
ruled that for the purposes of § 523(a)(2)(A), the fraud of one
member of a partnership can be imputed to another member
who had no knowledge of it.149 In doing so, the court relied on the
Supreme Court's decision in Strang v Bradner,so which predates
the Bankruptcy Code.151 According to Strang, fraud perpetrated
by one partner not only makes the other partner vicariously liable for the fraud (following traditional rules of vicarious liability), but also makes the other partner's debt nondischargeable.152
In other words, this particular fault-based exception to discharge does not depend on the debtor's personal wrongdoing.
The extension of nondischargeability to vicariously liable debtors is not only found in the context of the § 523(a)(2)(A) exception for debts obtained through fraud. In the Ninth Circuit case
In re Cecchini,153 the court ruled that a debtor who was vicariously liable in tort for an act of conversion committed by his
partner could not discharge that debt because it was covered by
§ 523(a)(6), which excepts debts resulting from "willful and malicious injury."154 The court ruled this way even though
§ 523(a)(6) specifically provides that only debts that are "for willful and malicious injury by the debtor to another entity or to the
property of another entity" are included in the exception.15s
Courts routinely apply fault-based exceptions to discharge even
when debtors are not themselves culpable for the relevant
fault-and even when the explicit language of the provision suggests otherwise.156

970 F2d 1556 (6th Cir 1992).
See id at 1561.
150 114 US 555 (1885).
151 Ledford, 970 F2d at 1561.
152 See Strang, 114 US at 561.
153 780 F2d 1440 (9th Cir 1986).
154 Id at 1443-44.
155 11 USC § 523(a)(6) (emphasis added).
156 See In re Bullington, 167 Bankr 157, 163 (Bankr WD Mo 1994) (holding that one
partner's intentional tort can be imputed to another partner such that it is nondischargeable to them as well). But see In re Austin, 36 Bankr 306, 311-12 (Bankr MD
Tenn 1984) (holding that the debt of a rock concert promoter is dischargeable even if it
results from a death caused willfully and maliciously by a concert patron for whose conduct the promoter is vicariously liable under nonbankruptcy law); In re Davis, 23 Bankr
633, 635 (Bankr WND Ky 1982) (allowing discharge of a sheriffs debt from injury to the
plaintiff because the intent of other parties was not imputable for the purposes of bankruptcy law).
148
149
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Lessons from Vicarious Liability

The vicarious liability cases suggest that fault-based exceptions to discharge are not limited to cases where the debtor herself has engaged in the relevant disfavored activity. Further,
contrary to what some courts have asserted151 the language of
the securities violation provision might not be dispositivecourts have applied fault-based exceptions to third-party debtors
even when the text of the relevant exception explicitly specifies
that the misconduct must be the debtor's.
But the vicarious liability cases also suggest a rationale for
when nondischargeability should, and when it should not, be extended to third-party debtors.18 Recall that according to the economic theory of discharge, the purpose of discharge is to allocate
the risk of credit in an economically efficient way.15 9 When creditors are better positioned to bear the risks of credit, bankruptcy
law imposes those risks on them by granting debtors a discharge
right. However, when debtors are better positioned to bear the
risks of credit-for example, if they have withheld relevant information from their creditors-bankruptcy law imposes those
risks on these debtors by not allowing them to take advantage of
discharge.160

Note that when it comes to activities like fraud and intentional torts, there are two distinct risks involved: the risk that,
once the fraud or tort has occurred, the debtor will become insolvent, and the risk of the fraud or tort occurring in the first place.
Accordingly, there are two different questions to ask: Who, as
between the creditor and the debtor, is better positioned to bear
the risks of default on credit extended as the result of fraud or

See Part III.A.
Simply noting that law generally treats agents and principals alike is insufficient. After all, the law does not always treat principals and agents the same way. For
example, courts have historically been reticent to impose punitive damages on vicariously liable parties. See, for example, Maisenbacker v Society Concordia of Danbury, 42 A
67, 70 (Conn 1899); Craven v Bloomingdale, 64 NE 169, 171 (NY 1902). Accordingly, the
nondischargeability of vicarious liability debts cannot be explained solely on the basis of
the traditional legal conception of the principal-agent relationship. See Steven H. Resnicoff, Is It Morally Wrong to Depend on the Honesty of Your Partneror Spouse? Bankruptcy Dischargeabilityof Vicarious Debt, 42 Case W Res L Rev 147, 165-66 (1992). Moreover, since the rationale for the nondischargeability of vicarious liability debts is not
explained by the traditional legal conception of the principal-agent relationship, it is also
not limited to situations involving vicarious liability.
157

158

159 See Part I.B. 1.
160

See id.
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intentional tort? And who is better positioned to bear the risk of
fraudulent or intentionally tortious activity?161
It is difficult to determine who, as between a creditor and a
vicariously liable fraud or tort debtor, is better positioned to
bear the risk of the debtor's default. Unlike in the case of the
standard consumer bankruptcy, there is no reason to think that
creditors or debtors in this kind of case are systematically better
at either preventing default or insuring against it through diversification.162 But there is another risk involved here: the risk

of the fraud or tort occurring in the first place. And economic
analysis suggests that the doctrine of vicarious liability imposes
liability on the lower-cost monitor.163 That is, the law imposes vi-

carious liability on principals or partners precisely because they
are better situated than other creditors to monitor the risks of
their debtor agents or partners-whether those creditors are
voluntary (as in the case of normal credit transactions) or involuntary (as in the case of torts).164 The doctrine of vicarious liability shifts the risk associated with fraudulent or intentionally
tortious activity from the creditors of fraudulent or intentionally
tortious parties to lower-cost monitors-those parties' principals
and partners.
This line of reasoning has implications for the scope of individual discharge. Notions of optimal deterrence suggest that tort
and fraud claims should not be dischargeable.165 If fraud and intentional-tort debts are dischargeable, an individual debtor
evaluating the expected cost of fraud or tort will take into account the probability that his liability will be discharged in
bankruptcy. Thus, the debtor's expected costs of engaging in
fraud will be lower than the expected costs of the fraud as a
whole-the debtor will be underdeterred from engaging in
fraud.166
161 See Howard, 48 Ohio St L J at 1068-69 n 155 (cited in note 13).
162 See id.
163 See Alan 0. Sykes, The Economics of Vicarious Liability, 93 Yale L J 1231, 123438 (1984).
164 See id at 1234-38, 1256.
165 Jackson, 98 Harv L Rev at 1425 n 101 (cited in note 11). Nonetheless, despite
what optimal deterrence might suggest, only "willful and malicious" torts are nondischargeable. 11 USC § 523(a)(6).
166 See Alan Schwartz, Products Liability, Corporate Structure, and Bankruptcy:
Toxic Substances and the Remote Risk Relationship, 14 J Legal Stud 689, 714-18 (1985);
Christopher M.E. Painter, Note, Tort Creditor Priorityin the Secured Credit System: Asbestos Times, the Worst of Times, 36 Stan L Rev 1045, 1066-68 (1984). Judgment proofing through bankruptcy is not just a theoretical possibility; its prevalence has been well
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Similarly, if vicarious-liability-fraud debts are dischargeable, a principal or a partner evaluating the expected cost of failing to monitor his agent or partner for fraud will take into account the probability that his vicarious liability will be
discharged. Accordingly, her expected cost of failing to monitor
will be lower than the expected social cost of her failure to monitor-she will engage in an inefficiently low level of monitoring.
By making vicarious-liability-fraud debts nondischargeable in
bankruptcy, bankruptcy law not only shifts the risks of fraudulent and intentionally tortious activity from the creditors of
fraudulent and intentionally tortious parties to lower-cost monitors-it does so in a way that ensures that those lower-cost monitors will engage in an efficient level of monitoring.
C. Discharging Third-Party Securities Debts
As this Comment has shown, fault-based exceptions to default are not limited to instances of debtor wrongdoing. Debts,
including debts for fraud, can be nondischargeable even if the
underlying fault lies with someone else.167 The guiding principle
in determining dischargeability is risk allocation: whether it is
the risk of default in the case of the standard consumer debtor,
or the risk of tortious or fraudulent activity in the case of the vicariously liable debtor.168

Both kinds of risks-the risk of insolvency and the risk of an
underlying securities-law violation-exist in the case of thirdparty securities-law debtors that are required to disgorge profits
in the aftermath of a securities violation. To illustrate the distinction, consider the following example: Suppose that several
real estate developers want to cash out on their investment in
two properties. To that end, they incorporate High Life Co
("High Life") to own and develop the properties. Each property is
valued on High Life's books at $6 million. After taking account
of liabilities, the equity value of the company is $10 million. Accordingly, the public offering will seek to raise that amount for
the 100 percent equity interest in the two properties. To support
the offering price, High Life's prospectus states that each property's valuation reflects an independent estimate based on its
documented. See Lynn M. LoPucki, Virtual Judgment Proofing: A Rejoinder, 107 Yale L
J 1413, 1418-20 (1998). For an example of judgment proofing, see In re Hoffinger Industries Inc, 327 Bankr 389, 409-10 (Bankr ED Ark 2005).
167 See Part IV.A.
168 See Part IV.B.
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value as the site of a future high-rise apartment building. But in
reality, while the company's statement about the appraisal value of one property is true, the statement about the value of the
other isn't; the company knows that it will be unable to obtain
the permits necessary to develop the second property, rendering
it virtually worthless.
Someone who invests $100,000 has an equity interest which
would be worth $100,000 if the property values represented in
the prospectus were accurate, but is actually worth only
$50,000. The immediate paper loss of $50,000 that this investor
incurs as a direct result of the misrepresentation corresponds to
the risk of a securities-law violation. However, not all of High
Life's investors will realize this loss. Some will extract all or a
portion of their original investment before the violation is discovered. Some-the winners-may even withdraw more than
they invested. These other investors may be required to disgorge
some of the money they withdrew to be distributed among the
losers. Any erosion in their ability to disgorge that money due to
personal misfortune corresponds to the risk of insolvency.169
Whether those disgorgement debts are dischargeable in bankruptcy ought to be settled on appeal to notions of risk allocation.
1. Encouraging optimal monitoring for securities-law
violations.
As is the case with vicariously liable debtors, it is difficult to
determine who, as between third-party securities debtors and
their creditors, is better positioned to bear the risks of insolvency. That is, there is no reason to think that either will be systematically better situated to prevent insolvency or to insure
against it through diversification.17o Moreover, before drawing
any conclusions about the ideal allocation of the risk of securities-law violations between third-party securities debtors and
their creditors, we need to know more about them. Broadly, we
can distinguish between two kinds of investors: (1) those who
know, or are in a position to find out, about a securities-law violation; and (2) those who are not in a position to discover the securities-law violation.171 Although most unsophisticated investors
See id.
See text accompanying notes 162-64.
171 See generally Klarita Sadiraj and Arthur Schram, Informed and Uninformed Investors in an Experimental Ponzi Scheme (University of Amsterdam Working Paper, Feb
1999), online at http://wwwl.fee.uva.nllcreed/pdffiles/Pyramid11.PDF
(visited Nov 24,
169
170
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will be unable to discover a securities-law violation through
monitoring, there might be informed or skeptical investors that
we want to encourage to ask difficult questions and bring securities-law violations to light.172
To the extent that the law governing the distribution of assets in the aftermath of a securities-law violation tracks the distinction between sophisticated and unsophisticated investors by
requiring the former-but not the latter-to disgorge the money
that they withdraw from an illegal securities scheme, then the
analysis of these third-party securities debtors follows almost
directly from the analysis of vicariously liable fraud debtors.
Like those third parties who are found vicariously liable for
fraud, sophisticated investors are, by hypothesis, better positioned than others to monitor for, and alert the authorities to,
securities-law violations. Requiring that they disgorge the money that they extract eliminates any incentive they have not to
report those violations.173 Further, allowing them to discharge
their disgorgement debts in bankruptcy would result in suboptimal deterrence, by increasing the difference between the expected cost of failing to monitor (which is discounted by the
probability of insolvency) and the expected benefit of failing to
monitor.
The foregoing analysis is premised on the assumption that
the law governing the distribution of assets after a securitieslaw violation attempts to incentivize monitoring for securitieslaw violations by investors. This invites the following question:
Does the law in fact aim at identifying those investors who could
and should have monitored securities-law violators? Put simply,
does the law actually distinguish between sophisticated and unsophisticated investors?
2013) (distinguishing between informed and uninformed Ponzi investors and describing
their behavior in an experimental setting).
172 For a discussion of private-party gatekeepers, see Frank Partnoy, Barbariansat

the Gatekeepers?:A Proposalfor a Modified Strict Liability Regime, 79 Wash U L

Q 491,

540-46 (2001) (arguing for a modified strict liability regime for private gatekeepers to
financial markets); Kraakman, 2 J L, Econ, & Org at 53-55 (cited in note 67) (analyzing
"liability imposed on private parties who are able to disrupt misconduct by withholding
their cooperation from wrongdoers").
173 See Frank H. Easterbrook and Daniel R. Fischel, Optimal Damages in Securities
Cases, 52 U Chi L Rev 611, 634-35 (1985) (comparing the deterrence effects of "injury"
and "restitution" measures of damages in securities law); John D. Ellsworth, Disgorge-

ment in Securities Fraud Actions Brought by the SEC, 1977 Duke L J 641, 642-52 (describing the development of the disgorgement remedy in securities fraud actions brought
by the SEC).

The University of Chicago Law Review

1952

[80:1921

2. Distinguishing between sophisticated and
unsophisticated third parties.
If the goal of the law is to minimize the harm caused by securities-law violations by encouraging lower-cost monitors to
monitor for violations and blow the whistle before much money
is lost, then debts that result from a failure to monitor should
not be dischargeable in bankruptcy. Still, whether that is indeed
the goal of the law is not immediately obvious. But several legal
doctrines suggest, at least in part, that it is.
Much like fraud, violations of securities law can give rise to
common law vicarious liability.174 In addition, securities law expands the scope of statutory liability for securities-law violations
to include any of the violator's "controlling persons."175 Controlling persons are liable for securities violations that they either
knew about or had reasonable grounds to know about.176 The
purpose of expanding liability to include controlling persons is to
encourage controlling persons to "minimize the chance" of securities violations, by "us[ing their] power to influence" potential
securities violators and by "attempt[ing] to monitor" them and
"act[ing] appropriately where [they] erred."177 Controlling persons generally include individuals with well-defined legal responsibilities, like directors and officers of a corporation, but can
also include those, like certain shareholders, who have indirect
means of discipline and influence.178
Common law vicarious liability and statutory controllingperson liability are meant to encourage those third parties who
are best situated to monitor for, and deter, securities violations.
Accordingly, the goal of optimal deterrence suggests that debts
for both vicarious liability and controlling-person liability should
be nondischargeable in bankruptcy. While courts have long recognized that debtors who were vicariously liable for securities
See Hollinger v Titan Capital Corp, 914 F2d 1564, 1573-74 (9th Cir 1990).
See 15 USC §§ 77o, 78t.
176 See Jennifer H. Arlen and William J. Carney, Vicarious Liability for Fraud on
Securities Markets: Theory and Evidence, 1992 U Ill L Rev 691, 695.
177 G. A. Thompson & Co, Inc v Partridge,636 F2d 945, 959 (5th Cir 1981). But see
Arlen and Carney, 1992 U Ill L Rev at 701 (cited in note 176) (arguing that monitoring
by controlling persons might be ineffective).
178 See Myzel v Fields, 386 F2d 718, 738-39 (8th Cir 1967) (holding that shareholders were liable as controlling persons for nondisclosures and misrepresentations of stock
value made by other shareholders); In re Complete Management Inc Securities Litigation,
153 F Supp 2d 314, 331 (SDNY 2001) ("The test of whether an individual is a controlling
person for the purposes of § 20(a) is not a categorical one that turns solely on the individual's status as an officer or director. Rather, the inquiry is a functional one.").
174

175
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fraud could not discharge those debts in bankruptcy,179 those
courts were reticent to render debts arising from controllingperson liability nondischargeable.18o But with the addition of
§ 523(a)(19), it is now likely that debts resulting from controlling-person liability are also nondischargeable in bankruptcy.11
Common law and statutory vicarious liability for securities
violations are not the only legal doctrines that aim to incentivize
third-party monitoring of potential securities violators. In the
aftermath of a Ponzi scheme--once the primary wrongdoer's resources have been exhausted-the wreckage is usually cleaned
up by bankruptcy law. The trustee in bankruptcy can use fraudulent conveyance or restitution law to recapture some of the
payments made to those Ponzi investors that have extracted
some of, or even more than, their initial investments-the winners-to be distributed among the losing investors.182 The trus-

tee can recover profits, and even principal, by showing that
these winning investors acted in bad faith.183 Further, if a winning investor is deemed to have participated in the fraud, then
the burden of proof shifts-it is up to the winning investor to affirmatively demonstrate good faith.184 Importantly, good and bad

faith are measured according to an objective standard-"if a reasonable investor would have seen red flags and taken action,
then all investors should do so."8> The Restatement (Third) of
179 See In re Reuter, 686 F3d 511, 517-18 (8th Cir 2012).
180 See In re Miller, 276 F3d 424, 429 (8th Cir 2002); In re Villa, 261 F3d 1148,

1150-52 (11th Cir 2001).
181 See In re Reuter, 427 Bankr 727, 765-66 (Bankr WD Mo 2010) ("If Plaintiffs had
in fact established that Brown, Williams or any other person controlled by Debtor engaged in primary violations of the securities laws such that Debtor was liable as a controlling person, that liability is itself a securities law violation and may thus be nondischargeable under § 523(a)(19)."); In re Kummerfeld, 444 Bankr 28, 50-51 (Bankr SDNY
2011) (refusing to grant summary judgment, ruling that control-person liability debt was
nondischargeable under § 523(a)(19) solely because a genuine issue of material fact existed concerning debtor's affirmative defenses to controlling-person liability); In re
Treadwell, 423 Bankr 309, 317 (BAP 8th Cir 2010) (noting that the conclusion in Miller
was premised on the fact that at that time the Bankruptcy Code did "not contain a specific exception to discharge for securities law violations").
182 See McDermott, 72 Am Bankr L J at 159-84 (cited in note 5).
183 See 11 USC § 548(a)(1)(B). See also In re Cottrill, 118 Bankr 535, 537 (Bankr SD
Ohio 1990) (noting that "the Trustee has the burden of establishing that the transaction
was fraudulent").
184 See 11 USC § 548(a)(1)(A).
185 Saul Levmore, Rethinking Ponzi-Scheme Remedies in and out of Bankruptcy, 92
BU L Rev 969, 972 (2012). See also In re Agricultural Research and Technology Group,
Inc, 916 F2d 528, 535-36 (9th Cir 1990) ('These pronouncements indicate that courts
look to what the transferee objectively 'knew or should have known' in questions of good
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Restitution and Unjust Enrichment outlines some of the factors
that warrant inquiry by the investor, including the "defendant's
experience as an investor."186 The law that governs the recovery
of assets from third-party equity investors is substantively similar.187
This objective good faith standard essentially distinguishes
between sophisticated winners who could have brought a securities violation to an early end and unsophisticated, but lucky,
winners.188 In doing so, it identifies the lower-cost monitorsthose investors who might have suspected that a securities violation had occurred or was occurring. By requiring them to disgorge any profits that they made by failing to monitor (or failing
to disclose), the law encourages sophisticated investors to discover, and blow the whistle on, securities violations before more
money is lost. Disgorgement thus increases the likelihood that
sophisticated investors will monitor for securities violations189
Further, notions of optimal deterrence suggest that if those sophisticated investors, having been required to disgorge, become
insolvent and file for bankruptcy, they should not be able to discharge their disgorgement liability.190

faith, rather than examining what the transferee actually knew from a subjective standpoint.").
186 Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment § 67, comment f
(2011), quoting In re Lake State Commodities, Inc, 253 Bankr 866, 878 (Bankr ND Ill
2000) (listing other factors including "whether the debtor promised rates of return greatly exceeding market rates, whether the debtor provided implausible explanations as to
how it could pay those extremely high rates, and factors that would indicate insolvency,
such as a debtor's use of postdated checks or history of dishonored checks").
187 See Levmore, 92 BU L Rev at 974-75 (cited in note 185) (describing the treatment of equity investors). Indeed, the only difference is that in a true Ponzi schemewhere the wrongdoer is generally regarded as holding the investor's funds in a constructive trust-it may be more difficult for the bankruptcy trustee to recapture an investor's
principal. See id at 973-77 (proposing that investors in a Ponzi scheme should be treated
like standard equity investors).
188 Compare In re M & L Business Machine Co, 164 Bankr 657, 662-63 (D Colo
1994) (ruling that bankruptcy court did not clearly err in finding that Ponzi investor
lacked good faith where investor was knowledgeable and experienced about business, the
promised rate of return was ten to forty times market rates, and investor's inquiry into
the investment was cursory and lacked due diligence), with In re Hannover Corp, 310
F3d 796, 800-01 (5th Cir 2002) (concluding that the district court's finding that Ponzi
investor had acted in good faith was not clearly erroneous, given lack of evidence that
the investor had any involvement in the Ponzi scheme or had any means of ascertaining
that the investment scheme was fraudulent).
189 See Levmore, 92 BU L Rev at 980 (cited in note 185); Miriam A. Cherry and Jarrod Wong, Clawbacks: Prospective Contract Measures in an Era of Excessive Executive
Compensation and Ponzi Schemes, 94 Minn L Rev 368, 408-09 (2009). See also Easterbrook and Fischel, 52 U Chi L Rev at 634-35 (cited in note 173).
190 See Part IV.B.
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Consider the Wilcoxes again. According to the Oklahoma
court that required them to disgorge their profits, they were not
innocent investors at all. At best they "acted with reckless disregard for the legitimacy of Schubert's [Ponzi] scheme"; at worst
they "were actively involved" in the scheme.191 Put differently,
they were the second-lowest cost avoiders (after Schubert herself)-ideally positioned to bring an end to Schubert's scheme
before it sucked in more victims. The Oklahoma Supreme Court
was correct in requiring them to disgorge their profits from the
scheme: doing otherwise would have allowed them to benefit
from their failure to blow the whistle on Schubert's scheme.192
But the Tenth Circuit erred in allowing them to discharge that
liability in bankruptcy. In doing so, it blunted the incentive effect created by disgorgement liability.93
D. Final Considerations
Bankruptcy law-especially the law relating to individual
bankruptcies-is fraught with controversial moral and political
questions, with answers that can seem incoherent when considered as a whole. In particular, the scope of the individual right
of discharge, and the exceptions to that right, often seem like

191 Oklahoma Department of Securities v Wilcox, 267 P3d 106, 108 (Okla 2011).
192 It is not clear that the Oklahoma court actually applied the distinction between
sophisticated and unsophisticated investors in Schubert's scheme. Rather the court
seems to have required all of the winning investors to disgorge any "unreasonably high
dividends" that they received. Oklahoma Department of Securities v Blair, 231 P3d 645,
663, 670 (Okla 2010). See also Elizabeth Blair Wozobski, Note, More Money, More Problems: How Oklahoma's Novel Approach to Ponzi Scheme Clawbacks in Oklahoma Department of Securities ex rel. Faught v. Blair Means More Uncertaintyfor Investors, 64
Okla L Rev 805, 822-25 (2012). The failure to distinguish between sophisticated and unsophisticated winners-effectively creating an insurance regime through which the losses of losing investors are offset out of the gains of winning investors-might create moral
hazard by decreasing the incentives of individual investors to monitor for potential violations. See Levmore, 92 BU L Rev at 989 (cited in note 185); Cherry and Wong, 94 Minn L
Rev at 410 (cited in note 189).
193 In Sherman, 658 F3d at 1010-11, the other case to consider the issue of thirdparty securities violation debts, the SEC argued that an attorney's obligation to disgorge
funds he had received-but not earned-on contingency from clients who had themselves
received the funds in violation of securities laws was nondischargeable under
§ 523(a)(19). The attorney, who arrived on the scene well after the securities violation
had occurred, was in no position to prevent the securities fraud from happening. Accordingly, the court's decision to allow the discharge of his disgorgement obligation is consistent with the proposed approach. Indeed, the court rightly suggested that the SEC
might have been more successful had it claimed that the obligation was nondischargeable under the § 523(a)(4) discharge exception "for fraud or defalcation while acting in a
fiduciary capacity." Id at 1017, quoting 11 USC § 523(a)(4).
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little more than the legislative product of interest group horse
trading.194 As such, it might appear as if there is no comprehensive rhyme or reason to the discharge right and its exceptions.
There is undoubtedly some truth to this view; certain exceptions
to discharge seem like obvious concessions to interest group politics.196 The § 523(a)(19) exception for violations of securities law
can easily be understood as an ill-considered legislative reaction
to a traumatic series of high-profile frauds.196
At the same time, interpretation of ambiguous statutory
provisions requires giving principled justifications to those
provisions. By identifying a descriptive theory within bankruptcy law jurisprudence-the notion that discharge is used to
efficiently allocate certain risks of credit between debtors and
creditors-and using it to answer a normative question of statutory interpretation, this Comment offers a small measure of
coherence to the Bankruptcy Code's exception to discharge.
Specifically, this Comment argues that when the law imposes
liability on a particular party because it identifies that party as
a lower-cost monitor for potential wrongdoing, then bankruptcy
law should not allow that party to discharge that liability by
filing for bankruptcy. Allowing for the possibility of discharge
results in underdeterrence. This approach is implicit in the line
of cases that renders the fraud and intentional-tort debts of vicariously liable third parties nondischargeable in bankruptcy.197 Accordingly, it can be further extended to third-party
debts for securities violations. When securities law requires a
winning investor to disgorge profits from a securities violation
as a form of deterrence, then bankruptcy law should not allow
that disgorgement debt to be discharged in bankruptcy.19s
The risk-allocation approach proposed by this Comment is
also broadly consistent with the general orientation of the Sar194 See Eric A. Posner, The Political Economy of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978,
96 Mich L Rev 47, 48-49, 119-20 (1997) (explaining the political influences that shaped
the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, including some of the discharge provisions).
195 See, for example, 11 USC § 523(a)(9) (excepting from discharge debts "for death
or personal injury caused by the debtor's operation of a motor vehicle, vessel, or aircraft
if such operation was unlawful because the debtor was intoxicated from using alcohol, a
drug, or another substance"); Karen Gross, Preserving a Fresh Start for the Individual
Debtor: The Case for Narrow Construction of the Consumer Credit Amendments, 135 U
Pa L Rev 59, 75-81 (1986) (describing the Consumer Credit Amendments to the Bankruptcy Code as the result of the "consumer credit industry's lobbying efforts").
196 See text accompanying notes 65-70.
197 See Part IV.B.
198 See Part IV.C.
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banes-Oxley Act. As part of its comprehensive effort to prevent
corporate fraud, Sarbanes-Oxley not only created new securities violations and instituted tougher penalties for violations,
but also directed the SEC to enlist third-party gatekeepers to
monitor for securities violations by others-in part by expanding the scope of gatekeeper liability.199 The risk-allocation approach to the securities violation discharge exception can be
understood as ensuring the effectiveness of that expanded
gatekeeper liability. Put differently, to the extent that law incentivizes certain gatekeepers (for example, sophisticated
Ponzi scheme investors) to monitor for, and prevent, securities
violations by imposing liability on them, bankruptcy law
should not undermine that incentive by allowing them to discharge that liability.200
It might be argued that this approach ignores the moral
imperative that animates bankruptcy law in general and discharge in particular: to "relieve the honest debtor from the
weight of oppressive indebtedness and permit him to start
afresh free from the obligations and responsibilities consequent
upon business misfortunes."201 In other words, this approach
ignores the goal of the Bankruptcy Code to extend discharge to
every "honest but unfortunate debtor."202 But it is not obvious
that the moral explanation for discharge provides a betterthat is, more coherent-account of the exceptions to discharge.203 For one, it does not explain why only particular kinds
of moral misconduct are singled out for opprobrium.204 Moreover, it does not explain those exceptions to discharge that do
not seem to involve any dishonesty, like those accompanying strict liability violations of security laws (or even those

See text accompanying notes 66-69.
That is not to say that law currently imposes optimal liability on gatekeepers,
only that, by allowing for discharge, bankruptcy law undermines the incentive effects
created by gatekeeper liability. For more on optimal measures of gatekeeper liability, see
Hamdani, 77 S Cal L Rev at 102-06 (cited in note 69).
201 Local Loan Co v Hunt, 292 US 234, 244 (1934), quoting Williams v United States
Fidelity & Guaranty Co, 236 US 549, 554-55 (1915).
202 Local Loan, 292 US at 244.
203 See Lawrence Ponoroff, Vicarious Thrills: The Case for Application of Agency
Rules in Bankruptcy Dischargeability Litigation, 70 Tulane L Rev 2515, 2560 (1996)
(noting that a "debtor's moral virtue" is not "an essential factor in explaining the discharge exceptions").
204 See text accompanying notes 34-38.
199
200
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accompanying debt for vicarious liability, itself a form of strict
liability).205
In addition, it is not obvious that the moral theory of discharge would reach a different resolution to the problem of
third-party securities debtors. To the extent that the moral
theory of discharge can account for the nondischargeability of
vicarious liability debts, it is because the vicariously liable party should have done more to prevent the underlying wrong. His
failure to do so rendered him undeserving of discharge.206 A
similar argument can be made in the context of third-party securities debts. The law requires sophisticated third parties to
disgorge profits in the event that they should have monitored
for an underlying violation of securities law and failed to do so.
This failure arguably makes them undeserving of bankruptcy
law's fresh start, which is reserved only for "honest but unfortunate debtor[s]."207 For those who favor the moral theory of
discharge, this argument-which leads to the same conclusion-may be more satisfying than one that relies on an economic theory of discharge.
CONCLUSION
This Comment addresses the question of whether thirdparty debts for violations of securities law-that is, the debts of
those other than the primary violator-should be dischargeable
in bankruptcy. It argues that since the aim of individual discharge is to allocate the risks of credit-both the risks of insolvency and the risks of the behavior giving rise to the extension
of credit-between debtors and creditors, the focus of the inquiry should be whether third-party securities debtors are better situated than their creditors to minimize the risk of securities-law violations. To the extent that the law that imposes
third-party securities liability identifies those who are better
situated to monitor and put an end to securities-law violations,
optimal deterrence suggests that that liability should not be
dischargeable in bankruptcy. Accordingly, if a debtor's liability
arises out of a legal doctrine that does just that-including, but
not limited to, vicarious liability and restitution liability for a
See Parts III and N.A.
See Jane Stapleton, Product Liability 191 (Butterworths 1994) (defending vicarious liability on the moral ground that principals operate under a "profit motive ... in
creating the opportunity for [their agents] to act").
207 Local Loan, 292 US at 244.
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fraudulent conveyance-then his debt should not be dischargeable. This result lends coherence to an area of the law where it
is otherwise lacking.

IEB

